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The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) remains stalled despite the political 
impetus provided by the Seoul G-20 Summit in November 
2010. The major trading nations have not revised their posi-
tions enough to propel new negotiations on agriculture, manu-
factures, and services. There is now little chance to complete 
an agreement this year and little indication that current efforts 
could succeed next year. 
In 2011, the US Congress faces an unusually heavy agenda 
of trade legislation, including implementing bills for pending 
free  trade  agreements  with  South  Korea,  Colombia,  and 
Panama and reauthorization of the trade adjustment assistance 
and developing-country trade preference programs.
With such a full legislative agenda, the Obama admin-
istration has been extremely cautious about putting forward 
new negotiating proposals in the Doha Round that would risk 
inciting additional congressional opposition to those efforts. 
Other major trading nations have shown similar timidity: The 
political will claimed by the Seoul Summit leaders to “bring 
the  Doha  Development  Round  to  a  successful,  ambitious, 
comprehensive, and balanced conclusion” is lacking not only in 
Washington but also prominently in Beijing, Brasilia, Brussels, 
Delhi, and Tokyo. No wonder that the Doha Round has been 
relegated to a second- or third-tier priority for US economic 
policy; the near-term prospects for success have faded to white.
The impending crisis in the trade talks has generated the 
expected mix of angst and callow indifference. Trade diplomats 
continue their vacuous rhetoric while academic and legal experts 
pollute  internet  forums  with  uninformed  comments  about 
the decade-long negotiations coupled with wildly impractical 
solutions. The objective of this policy brief is to do better by 
clarifying the policy options for dealing with the Doha Round 
currently  before  political  leaders  and  then  recommending  a 
course of action that is both consistent with near-term political 
constraints  and  the  objective  of  advancing  world  trade  and 
economic development.
Policy oPtions
Doha Round “doctors” have prescribed a wide range of treat-
ments  for  what  ails  the  trade  talks,  ranging  from  placebo 
pills to euthanasia. In essence, the treatment options fall into 
three broad categories, summarized below. All have significant 
downside risks. 
First Option
The first option would be to declare victory and sign the deal 
“on the table.” This option is extolled by those who place a 
high premium on avoiding systemic damage that would likely 
occur if a multilateral trade negotiation (MTN) failed for the 
first time in the postwar era. The agreement would endorse 
the  formula  tariff  cuts  in  agriculture  and  non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA) plus reductions in agricultural subsi-
dies, already included in draft negotiating modalities tabled 
years ago in Geneva. The liberalization commitments contain 
substantial  flexibilities  for  developing  countries  to  either 
exempt or sharply limit the application of the Doha Round 
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However, there are two major problems with this option: 
The prospective gains are too small and are skewed toward 
too few countries. Peterson Institute analysis of the formula 
cuts yield only small trade gains for the United States: $7.6 
billion in increased US exports to the world and $14.3 billion 
in increased US imports. As a result, US GDP would rise by 
$9.3 billion.1
This is small potatoes for the US economy in the aggre-
gate. However, for some US producers, the loss of protection 
or subsidy could be meaningful; those groups would strongly 
oppose the deal when it goes to Congress for ratification. 
Would  anyone  stand  up  for  the  systemic  benefits  and 
lobby for the deal? The export-oriented lobbies have bigger 
fish to fry and the service industries have nothing to gain 
from the Doha Round, so they won’t stand up either. Even 
if US officials agreed to such a deal, the US Congress would 
probably defer action or even reject it unless the president 
committed an extraordinary amount of political capital to its 
ratification.
A further problem is that the small gains are unevenly 
distributed and largely benefit a few countries; China is the 
big winner at the expense of most other major trading nations. 
Chinese GDP gains total almost $10 billion from the formula 
cuts, slightly more than the US increase. Developing coun-
tries (excluding China) receive only about one-fifth of the 
total welfare gains from the formula cuts in agriculture and 
NAMA.2 It is hard to call this result a “development round.”
Second Option
The second option is to pull the plug on the decade-long talks. 
“Declare failure and go home” would recognize the impasse 
in  the  negotiations  and  the  lack  of  political  will  to  break 
1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Woan Foong Wong. 
2010. Figuring Out the Doha Round.  Washington: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.
2. See Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong, 2010, table 1.3.  In the sample of  
22 countries accounting for 88 percent of global GDP, developing countries 
accrue $21.5 billion of the $55.5 billion in global GDP gains, but China  
accounts for $9.7 billion of the $21.5 billion.  Thus other developing coun-
tries represent only 21 percent of the total ($21.5 billion minus $9.7 billion / 
$55.5 billion).
it—even with the best efforts of the G-20 Summit leaders. 
Pending commitments to reform farm export subsidies and 
to remove tariffs and quotas affecting exports from the least 
developed countries (LDCs)—the so-called duty-free, quota-
free initiative—would lapse. Developing countries, especially 
the poorer ones not linked to trade pacts with major industrial 
nations, would be the big losers.
In  assessing  this  option,  one  should  consider  to  what 
extent Doha’s demise would constrain future WTO negotia-
tions. Former US Trade Representative Susan Schwab argues 
that pulling the plug on the decade-long trade talks would 
clear  the  path  for  future  new  negotiations  on  a  modified 
agenda of issues.3 But would it? The issues that have clogged 
the arteries of the Doha effort, especially tariff and subsidy 
reforms in agriculture and NAMA, would remain priorities 
for the majority of WTO members and thus would have to be 
included in any subsequent WTO package of agreements. And 
targeting new areas for negotiation like trade-related climate 
change or currency issues—even among a small subgroup of 
WTO members—would also likely falter; the core countries 
needed for such “plurilaterals” are the same ones complicating 
the current talks and would raise problems in these new areas 
as well.
This option would have little near-term impact on the 
US economy (since most US trading interests already have 
discounted any Doha results). However, it probably would 
inflict substantial damage over time on the credibility and 
effectiveness  of  theWTO  in  two  ways.  First,  it  would  cast 
doubt on the efficacy of the WTO as a forum for multilateral 
trade negotiations. Who will want to invest time and effort 
into  another  Geneva  negotiation  after  10  years  of  barren 
negotiations?  Government  and  business  leaders,  who  once 
valued the GATT/WTO as a place where one could get things 
done, will concentrate their efforts on more expeditious and 
productive bilateral and regional forums for reducing trade 
and investment barriers. This shift is already pronounced but 
would accelerate.
Second,  the  WTO’s  dispute  settlement  process  would 
gradually degrade as rulings attempt, or at least are seen to be 
attempting, to bridge gaps in WTO rights and obligations left 
unfilled by the dormant MTNs. If the panelists are regarded 
as usurping the powers of WTO negotiators, it could trigger a 
backlash against the WTO and political resistance to compli-
ance with such rulings. Members of Congress already think 
this is a problem with regard to the numerous WTO rulings 
against US antidumping practices. 
3. Susan C. Schwab. 2011. “After Doha.”  Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/
June).
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Third Option
The third option is to recognize that the talks cannot conclude 
in the current environment and that the Doha Round needs a 
“time-out.” This option avoids blame for killing the round, 
while recognizing that—given the current political climate in 
the major trading nations and the dead zone for closing a deal 
in 2012 due to elections in several countries and the change 
in Chinese leadership—the negotiating impasse is unlikely to 
be broken in the near future. To a large extent, a time-out is 
basically what took place for almost two years after the July 
2008 debacle in Geneva—even though officials kept up the 
appearance of active negotiations.
The problem with this option is stark: If the WTO talks 
go into hibernation, there is no telling when, or if, they will 
wake up. Hibernation could easily become termination as it 
did in the negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
Getting WTO members to return to the negotiating table and 
invest more time and effort into a process that demonstrably 
failed to produce tangible results after a decade of work won’t 
be easy. Before WTO members call a time-out, consideration 
should be given to what needs to be done to ensure that coun-
tries have an incentive to work to finish a WTO deal in 2013. 
I offer some ideas in the final section of this policy brief.
Moreover,  in  the  interim,  trade  officials—spurred  on 
by  business  constituencies  as  noted  above—will  continue 
to  negotiate  bilateral  or  regional  agreements.  Indeed,  the 
scope and pace of such initiatives have accelerated since the 
breakdown in the Geneva talks in July 2008. Much of the 
negotiating  action  involves  the  major  Asian  countries  and 
discriminates against trade and investment from third coun-
tries. While these preferential deals could chart a course back 
to Geneva, they more likely will divert attention and interest 
away from the WTO.
In  sum,  over  the  near  term,  the  Doha  Round  seems 
destined for the parking lot. G-20 leaders have not matched 
the  fine  words  of  their  summit  declarations  with  concrete 
action.  US  initiatives  to  break  the  impasse  have  been  too 
tentative to dispel longstanding concerns—based on previous 
Doha Round experience—that the United States would really 
raise its offers. However, such action probably would not have 
been sufficient in any event since it is unlikely that key Doha 
participants would have matched new US offers.  China seems 
to have shifted into neutral pending the installation of its new 
leadership; EU officials seem to lack a forward gear when it 
comes to further commitments on agriculture; and Brazil and 
India fear they don’t have the horsepower to keep pace with 
China. In the race to the Doha Round finish line, these coun-
tries have run out of gas.
Recommendations foR Us Policy GoinG 
foRwaRd 
If this analysis is correct, then—at best—the Doha Round will 
be adrift at least until 2013. Under either option 2 or 3, US 
officials would receive a large share of the blame for Doha’s 
woes. So what should the United States do now to deflect 
such criticism, minimize damage to the WTO, and advance 
US trading interests? 
Simply put, the United States needs to keep open the 
multilateral option while accelerating bilateral and regional 
trade initiatives. The former requires, as a practical matter, 
making a down payment (in the form of provisional imple-
mentation of specific reforms) on a future Doha package; the 
latter requires working particularly with the European Union, 
Brazil, and India to resolve problems that can subsequently be 
“locked in” WTO schedules.
Preserving the Multilateral Option
US policy first needs to demonstrate that US officials continue 
to be committed to a strong multilateral trading system and 
place high value on WTO rules and obligations. To that end, 
US officials need to reconfirm that the United States is willing 
to return to the WTO talks (which they have already done) 
once other major trading nations are willing to put together 
a bigger Doha package and that they will take concrete steps 
that encourage those countries to do so (which they have not 
done very well). 
In essence, the United States and other major trading 
nations need to make a down payment on a future package of 
WTO accords that would be more ambitious and balanced than 
what is currently on the table in Geneva. Conceivably, it also 
could include agreements in areas not yet subject to Doha 
discussions  (just  as  the  Uruguay  Round  added  new  issues 
mid-stream, e.g., the agreement to establish the WTO) or 
commitments to launch new WTO negotiations as soon as the 
G-20 leaders have not matched the fine 
words of their summit declarations with 
concrete action. US initiatives to break 
the impasse have been too tentative 
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Doha Round accords enter into force on a built-in agenda of 
issues specified in the final Doha deal (as was done in services 
after  the  Uruguay  Round).  Candidates  for  such  a  built-in 
agenda should include issues such as competition policy and 
investment that had been put aside at the WTO ministerial 
in Cancun in 2003 as well as climate change measures and 
currency issues. Commitments to post-Doha talks in these 
areas could help make a down payment more ambitious and 
balanced and therefore more likely to encourage resumption 
of WTO negotiations.
The  “down  payment”  strategy  should  not  be  confused 
with early harvest proposals: The implementation of reforms 
would be provisional and revocable if WTO members did not 
reengage trade talks by early 2013. The down payment would 
be a “carrot” to encourage them to do so; the expiration date 
would be a “stick” to guard against procrastination. 
“Early  harvest”  is  a  confusing  concept  in  any  event.  It 
implies a small-scale, finished deal that might be supplemented 
in the future but creates doubts about political commitment 
to subsequent negotiation. Yet, this approach is the one put 
forward by WTO Director General Pascal Lamy at the informal 
high-level WTO meeting on May 31, 2011, with a specific 
focus on benefits for LDCs and very little coverage of market 
access reforms for other countries. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, however, it is not clear that one could put together a 
small package that was balanced among the interests of WTO 
members and could pass muster in legislative bodies. Closing 
deals in seemingly noncontentious areas like trade facilitation 
or environmental goods and services would not be easy; indeed, 
there are strong disagreements about the scope and coverage of 
new WTO disciplines in those areas, and many countries see 
these issues as key negotiating chips needed to induce better 
offers on agriculture, NAMA, and services. 
In contrast, the down payment would be like collateral 
on a contingent contract to return to the Geneva talks, if the 
prospective gains for all participants are substantially increased. 
There are a range of possible contributions to such a down 
payment,  but  the  prospective  actions  must  include  specific 
market access components as well as rulemaking obligations. 
If the major trading nations, both developed and developing, 
agree to up the ante in the WTO talks, then an agreement could 
be reached by yearend 2011 on down payments explicitly tied 
to a bigger package of trade reforms. To that end, consideration 
should be given to the following as potential parts of a WTO 
down payment:
n	implement the first 20 percent of cuts in tariffs and subsi-
dies that would be required under the formulas developed 
in the Agriculture and NAMA negotiations;
n	implement some aspects of the Doha package on a provi-
sional  basis  pending  final  resolution  of  the  deal  (as  has 
already been done more than four years ago for the agree-
ment on transparency of regional trading arrangements). 
The most important measure to include in this area would 
be the commitment to eliminate agricultural export subsi-
dies by 2013 (the date of the next EU review of its farm 
policies) to preclude the reimposition of such measures 
once commodity prices fall back to more normal levels;  
n	provide targeted technical and financial assistance as part of 
the trade facilitation package (similar to recent US bilateral 
offers to Egypt); in essence, the trade component of the 
G-8 package from the 2011 Deauville Summit; and
n	eliminate tariffs on an agreed list of environmental goods. 
Doha participants have played protectionist games with 
the composition of such a list; instead, they should agree 
to adopt a list compiled by the World Bank that updates 
the products included in its 2007 recommendation in this 
area.
Could  more  be  done  for  LDCs  as  part  of  these  down 
payments? Doing so would address the critical requirements 
for the WTO talks put forward by Pascal Lamy on May 31, 
2011 and demonstrate the continued commitment of the major 
trading nations to the development objectives of the original 
Doha mandate. The desire to extend full duty-free, quota-free 
treatment for LDC exports would require new US legislation, 
which would face strong opposition from the textile and apparel 
industries and likely fail in the absence of broader benefits for 
US trading interests in a prospective final WTO deal. So duty-
free, quota-free offers would need to work around that political 
roadblock, perhaps by excluding some tariff lines (as already 
discussed at the Hong Kong ministerial in 2005), and focus 
instead on simplifying and harmonizing eligibility criteria for 
LDC preference programs (including rules of origin), which 
could yield immediate gains for LDC exports. 
Such an offer would hopefully refresh interest in achieving 
substantial multilateral trade reforms and encourage political 
leaders to refocus on WTO talks, in 2013 if not sooner. And 
if the deal doesn’t come together, the reform commitments and 
rulemaking obligations included in the down payment would 
expire.
The United States needs to keep open the 
multilateral option while accelerating 
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Bilateral and Trilateral Initiatives
While the Doha Round hibernates, it is crucial for the United 
States to continue to pursue broad-ranging agreements with 
developed and developing countries to maintain momentum 
for trade liberalization and create a buffer against protectionist 
pressures. In this regard, the United States should push for 
early conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, 
which could set constructive precedents for future multilateral 
accords once the Doha Round negotiations are revived. 
At the same time, working with the European Union, 
Brazil,  and  India  could  both  resolve  outstanding  bilateral 
problems  and  create  rulemaking  precedents  that  could  be 
brought back to Geneva. For example, the United States and 
European Union could negotiate a bilateral deal on services. 
Since there is a good chance that EU-Japan negotiations could 
be launched in the near future—modeled on the EU-Korea 
and US-Korea pacts—consideration also should be given to 
a  trilateral  services  pact  including  Japan.  Similarly,  several 
US-EU bilateral issues overlap with current talks with Brazil, 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
which could be usefully discussed trilaterally; policies regarding 
subsidies and standards for renewable energy (including bio 
fuels and wind/solar power generation) fall into this category.
More broadly, the United States and European Union 
have common interests in supporting economic development, 
trade, and investment in the Middle East and North Africa 
region and in working with India to develop its infrastruc-
ture and service sector. In these areas, work among key Doha 
participants could establish a supplemental package of reforms 
that, if extended on a multilateral basis, could encourage other 
WTO members to reciprocate. 
How would such a proposal affect China’s role in the 
WTO  negotiations?  Overall,  the  down  payment  proposal 
offers China a constructive option for keeping the talks open 
and  avoiding  disruption  in  the  multilateral  trading  system 
from which it greatly benefits. The suggested tariff cuts would 
require  China  to  reduce  its  applied  tariffs  (since  Chinese 
bound tariffs are generally low and close to currently applied 
rates) and contribute to a compromise on environmental goods 
liberalization. The complementary US initiatives with Europe 
and other Asia-Pacific countries would also demonstrate how 
regional trade efforts provide precedents for MTNs and hope-
fully will encourage the Chinese—perhaps in 2013 after the 
new  leadership  is  settled  in—to  consider  increased  market 
access offers and new subsidy and other rulemaking reforms in 
both the Asia-Pacific and WTO negotiations. Indeed, if those 
talks tee up new WTO efforts in areas like energy and climate 
change, competition policy, and currency issues, they could 
well frame the built-in agenda for new negotiations included 
in the final WTO package of accords in 2013. 
The United States and other major trading 
nations need to make a down payment on a 
future package of WTO accords that would 
be more ambitious and balanced than 
what is currently on the table in Geneva.